

P R

B X

POWERBOX  
Mastering Power

From Power Plant to POL  
Cyber-Criminals are on you!

Powerbox

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# Powerbox – Smart Grid Security

## Presenter – Patrick Le Fèvre

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Patrick Le Fèvre is an international marketer and engineer who has worked in power electronics for over three decades.

His career has been focused on power products since 1982 when he started with a start-up called Micro-Gisco (France).

He joined Powerbox Sweden in September 2015 as Marketing Director and in January 2016 was promoted Chief Marketing and Communication Officer for the all Group.

Prior Powerbox, he held senior marketing and communication roles at Ericsson, Power Modules division, for 20 years.

Patrick Le Fèvre is the author of several articles and marketing papers presented at various conferences, and deeply involved in a number of groups and associations related to power-supplies, energy efficiency and contributing to promote new technologies within the power community.

Patrick Le Fèvre received most of his education in France, where he studied electronics, microelectronics and industrial marketing, and where he received a civil engineer degree in 1982.

[www.prbx.com](http://www.prbx.com)

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## Company key numbers

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1974

Gnesta

150

Power people

15

Countries

25

R&D and Engineering

3

R&D center in  
Europe

>6M

6,000,000 hours  
Proven MTBF

>1M

Units/year

>90%

Returning customers

UN.GC

Environmental  
Social  
Governance  
engagement

3.500

Custom projects  
since 1974

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## The journey!

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
- Smart Grid overview
- At start was Aurora
- From simple to complex attacks
- Securing the Smart Grid
- Are we safe at board level?
- Conclusions
- Happy to answer your questions



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## The business case

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
- Reduce cost to consumers
- Better ability to manage peaks on demand
- Defer or avoid to build extra infrastructures
- Reducing greenhouse gases and carbon footprint
- Integration of renewable energies (wind, solar... ) into the grid
- Smart metering and better control of energy distribution and consumption
- Flexibility



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## From Electricity to Intelligent Network

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- Smart Grid (SG) is an ecosystem
- Migration from Electricity generation and distribution to intelligent network
- From Generator to Consumer SG is transforming into a huge data network
- New technologies and connected devices (e.g. IoT) are increasing interfaces
- Risk of intrusion and cyber-attacks are increasing as Grid connectors booming

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## At start it was a Grid...

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

Source: Institute for Energy Research ([IER](#))



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## Then arrived the Smart Grid...

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e.g. The IEC 60870 is a set of standards which define systems used for tele-control in supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) in electrical engineering and power system automation applications.





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## The Threats

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Threat-Source	Motivations	Threat Actions
Hacker, cracker	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Challenge</li> <li>• Ego</li> <li>• Rebellion</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Hacking</li> <li>• Social engineering</li> <li>• System intrusion, break-ins</li> <li>• Unauthorized system access</li> </ul>
Computer criminal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Destruction of information</li> <li>• Illegal information disclosure</li> <li>• Monetary gain</li> <li>• Unauthorized data alteration</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Computer crime (e.g., cyber stalking)</li> <li>• Fraudulent act (e.g., replay, interception)</li> <li>• Information bribery</li> <li>• Spoofing</li> <li>• System intrusion</li> </ul>
Terrorism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Blackmail</li> <li>• Destruction</li> <li>• Exploitation</li> <li>• Revenge</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Bomb/Terrorism</li> <li>• Information warfare</li> <li>• System attack (e.g., distributed denied of service)</li> <li>• System penetration</li> <li>• System tampering</li> </ul>
Industrial espionage (companies, foreign government, other government interest)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Competitive advantage</li> <li>• Economic espionage</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Economic exploitation</li> <li>• Information theft</li> <li>• Intrusion on personal privacy</li> <li>• Social engineering</li> <li>• System penetration and unauthorized access</li> </ul>
Insiders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Curiosity</li> <li>• Ego</li> <li>• Intelligence</li> <li>• Monetary gain</li> <li>• Revenge</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Blackmail</li> <li>• Malicious code (e.g., virus, logic, Trojan horse)</li> <li>• Fraud and theft</li> <li>• System sabotage</li> <li>• Input falsified, corrupted data interception</li> </ul>





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## The Consequences

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- Population
- Reputational
- Infrastructures
- Regulatory
- Equipment
- Data protection and privacy
- Safety
- Economic



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## The Consequences

Category	Consequences
Population	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Population affected, e.g., loss of power or observable quality issues (flicker)</li> <li>Safety related issues</li> </ul>
Reputational	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Loss of trust and confidence</li> </ul>
Infrastructures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Shut down of dependent infrastructure</li> </ul>
Regulatory	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sanctions / Warnings, penalties (€), disgorgement (€) and other compliance measures</li> </ul>
Equipment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Damage to ICT equipment</li> <li>Damage to power systems equipment</li> </ul>
Data Protection and Privacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Disclosure or modification of personal or sensitive data</li> </ul>
Safety	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Minor or serious injury</li> <li>Loss of life</li> </ul>
Economic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Cost of electrical losses</li> <li>Customer outage costs, i.e. cost of energy not supplied</li> <li>Congestion costs, resistive power losses, power import, ancillary service usage</li> <li>Investigation and repair time, work time lost</li> </ul>





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The real life...

From Aurora to POL

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## At start was the AURORA

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March 04, 2007

### → 2006 / 2007 The Aurora project

- Idaho National Lab. accessed a generator
- Supervisory Control & Data Acquisition (SCADA) used to access and send commands
- Generator destroyed through simulated “cyber attack”

### → Lessons learned

- Physical damage can result from a cyber attack
- Public / Private partnership complicated
- Lack of regulatory and guidance
- Discovering a new world of threats

### → Aurora opened the Pandora Box



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## From simple to complex attacks

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### →April 2007

- Exploit of Microsoft zero-day vulnerability to access energy company SCADA
- Origin of the attack through simple phishing
- Taking advantage of windows DNS vulnerability

### →August 2010


- Mutant of the “Stuxnet” worm propagated through SCADA into Smart Grid
- Suspected to be the first attack from another government not involving military action



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## Dark Christmas for Ukraine

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December 24, 2015

- Direct attacks toward regional distribution system (Ivano-Frankivsk region)
- 225 000 customers impacted
- Multiple modus operandi
  - Phishing e-mails - BlackEnergy 3 malware
  - KillDisk attacking Master Boot record
  - Control of Human Machine Interface (HMI)
  - Control of UPSs operation
  - Physical sabotage
- February 25, 2016 US Dept. of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a formal alert



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## Ransomware shutdown BWL

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April 26, 2016

- Michigan - Board of Water & Light (BWL) attacked through Ransomware
- BWL forced to shutdown all IT systems
- FBI involved in the investigations
- Several months for BWL to restore
- Attack suspected to come from another country from cyber-criminal organization
- This case is considered as part of a mechanism to attack Energy Suppliers



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## Connecting SG to DDoS

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- September 2016 – OVH (France)
  - Massive Distributed Denial-of-Service DDoS attack through 150 000 IoT devices (CCTV cameras and smart-meters) 1Tbps
- October 2016 – Dyn (USA)
  - Dyn getting “tens of millions” of messages from Internet-connected devices, including smart-meters
- November 2016 – Deutsche Telekom
  - More than 900 000 customers knocked offline - Routers infected by a new variant of a computer worm known as Mirai



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## Securing the Smart Grid

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- The US Department Of Energy (DOE) released a number of projects and initiatives, as well other governmental agencies
- December 2016 – White House published the “National Electric Grid Security And Resilience Plan”
- The European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA), the EU-funded SPARKS (Smart Grid Protection Against Cyber Attacks – project) and many others building safer SG
- International projects aiming to bridge US and EU into a common protection alliance in discussion



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## What about at board level?

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- Power community is not used to deal with security
- Hacker could access a system through industrial SCADA without any problem
- How much is PMBus secured?
- Is the power industry too confident?
- Insider threats are real (Dolphin case)
- Cyber criminality is increasing faster than we could imagine
- Power industry must deploy strategies to include highest level of security in any layer of software



# Powerbox – Smart Grid Security Conclusions

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- Smart Grid is a very complex architecture requiring high level of cooperation to protect
- Learning by mistake is not an option!
- Governmental initiatives are accelerating though political instability increasing threats at high pace
- Creating awareness and educating power designers and systems architects business critical
- In front of Cyber Criminality, nothing is for granted
- Cyber security starts at board level
- Sounds dramatic though a lot of fun ahead!

# Powerbox – Smart Grid Security References

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Is your Smart Grid Secured (IEEE)

<http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=7790948>

February 25, 2016 US Dept. of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a formal alert

<https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/alerts/IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01>

Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid

[http://www.nerc.com/pa/CI/ESISAC/Documents/E-ISAC\\_SANS\\_Ukraine\\_DUC\\_18Mar2016.pdf](http://www.nerc.com/pa/CI/ESISAC/Documents/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_18Mar2016.pdf)

ENISA – Smart Grid Security

[https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/critical-information-infrastructures-and-services/smart-grids/smart-grids-and-smart-metering/ENISA\\_Annex%20II%20-%20Security%20Aspects%20of%20Smart%20Grid.pdf](https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/critical-information-infrastructures-and-services/smart-grids/smart-grids-and-smart-metering/ENISA_Annex%20II%20-%20Security%20Aspects%20of%20Smart%20Grid.pdf)

Salesforce Security CTO: How A DDoS Attack Can Impact A Smart Grid

<http://www.crn.com/news/internet-of-things/video/300083164/salesforce-security-cto-how-a-ddos-attack-can-impact-a-smart-grid.htm>

White House – National Electric Grid Action Plan

[https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/images/National\\_Electric\\_Grid\\_Action\\_Plan\\_06Dec2016.pdf](https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/images/National_Electric_Grid_Action_Plan_06Dec2016.pdf)

Digital attack tracking

<http://www.digitalattackmap.com>

**Book to read:**

"Countdown to Zero Day" by Kim Zetter

<https://www.amazon.com/Countdown-Zero-Day-Stuxnet-Digital/dp/0770436196>





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Thanks for your attention!

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